A critique on the falsification of free will by using Libet-style experiments

Abstract: From the late 20th century onwards, the idea of a free conscious will which we tend to attribute to each rational human being is coming under serious pressure. It seems that with the experiments of the psychologist Benjamin Libet and, more recently, John-Dylan Haynes, the idea of free conscious will has to sing its final swan song. But if the idea of free will might be a dogmatic relic from pre-scientific times, then this also counts for the famous proverb that science always ought to have the right on a last, final judgement. In this paper, we will examine both the 'weak' and 'hard' problem of experiments conducted in the positivist spirit of Libet and Haynes. Do the experiments have much explanatory power? What about the issue of causality and predictability? Can conscious experience be naturalized to its physical substratum? And what about the nature of deliberate action? These are the main questions that will be addressed in this paper.

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